FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR UML (UNIFIED MODELING LANGUAGE) by Prof Supriya Shivhare & Naveen Hemranjani
                                          International Journal of Advanced Engineering Technology           E-ISSN 0976-3945 
 
       IJAET/Vol.III/ Issue I/January-March, 2012/82-88 
 
 
                                                                                  Research Article  
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR UML (UNIFIED MODELING 
LANGUAGE) 
1
Supriya Shivhare, Prof. Naveen Hemranjani 
                                
                      Address for Correspondence  
1
Student, M.Tech (S.E.) 
2
Vice Principal (M.Tech) 
Suresh Gyan Vihar University, Jaipur(Raj.), India 
ABSTRACT 
Software plays an increasing role in the safety critical systems. Increasing the quality and reliability of the software has 
become the major objective of software development industry. Researchers and industry practitioners, look for innovative 
techniques and methodologies that could be used to increase their confidence in the software reliability. Fault tree analysis 
(FTA) is one method under study at the Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) of NASA’s Goddard Space Flight 
Center to determine its relevance to increasing the quality and the reliability of software. This paper briefly reviews some of 
the previous research in the area of Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA). Next we discuss a roadmap for application of the 
SFTA to software, with special emphasis on object-oriented design. This is followed by a brief discussion of the paradigm 
for transforming a software design artifact (i.e., sequence diagram) to its corresponding software fault tree. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [1] is a technique used in 
the area of reliability. Initially, FTA was introduced 
in the 1960s, with the primary purpose of identifying 
those circumstances that could cause a system to 
reach a hazardous or unsafe state. FTA is powerful 
static analysis tool. Given a specific hazardous state, 
FTA uses a backward (also referred as top-down or 
deductive) search technique in order to identify 
conditions that would cause the system to reach that 
state. In other words, once a specific hazard is 
identified (hypothesized), FTA will search all 
possible combinations of the conditions (initial 
states) that could force the system to reach that state. 
FTA is a graphical analysis tool and uses two 
techniques in its analysis: qualitative and 
quantitative. Through the qualitative technique, FTA 
is capable of identifying all possible combinations of 
conditions that would cause the system to reach a 
hazardous state. These combinations of conditions 
are referred to as a cut set. A minimum cut set 
represents a minimum number of conditions that need 
to be satisfied in order to force the system into a 
hazardous state. The quantitative approach uses 
probability information associated with each 
condition (initial state) in order to calculate the 
probability of occurrence of the specific hazardous 
state. One of the advantages of the FTA is the fact 
that all attention is paid to a specific hazardous state 
and identification of preconditions that need to be 
satisfied in order to reach such a state. Of course, this 
could also become a disadvantage if FTA is the only 
technique used to identify hazardous states. This is 
due to the fact that it is possible for the analyst to 
overlook a specific hazardous state. In order to 
prevent this situation, other techniques such as 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [2], a 
forward (also referred as bottom-up or inductive) 
search, need to be used in conjunction with the FTA 
to identify all possible hazardous states for a system. 
FTA is typically applied to hardware systems, but 
recently attempts have been made to apply FTA to 
software. Section two elaborates on previous research 
in the area of the Software Fault Tree Analysis 
(SFTA), also a road map to application of Fault Tree 
(FT) throughout the development life cycle is 
presented.  
2. Software Fault Tree Analysis 
There has been significant research on software fault 
tree analysis, with the majority having been 
conducted by Leveson [3], Lutz [4], and Dugan [5]. 
In most cases, however, SFTA is used at the code 
level, and the size of the software (measured by lines 
of code) to which the SFTA has been applied, is 
relatively small, approximately one thousand lines of 
code. Leveson [6] has generated a set of templates 
that could be used in SFTA, where a specific 
language construct (syntax) has been represented in 
the form of fault tree. It is important to mention that 
when FTA is applied to software, and specifically at 
the code level, we are only addressing the qualitative 
analysis, since at this level quantitative analysis does 
not make sense. Therefore, at implementation 
(coding phase), the objective of using SFTA is to 
identify the set of instructions that could possibly 
cause the software to reach a hazardous state. 
Therefore, one could use SFTA in combination with 
formal code inspection in order to increase their 
confidence in the safety of the software under 
investigation. Finally, it has been pointed out by a 
number of researchers that SFTA shows some 
weaknesses when there are loops involved in the 
code, but loops are almost always present in 
software. Therefore, this is a weakness that needs to 
be overcome. Additional work by some researchers 
like Helmer [7], and Modugna [8] resulted in the 
application of the SFTA to requirements with some 
success in the detection of the weak or missing 
requirements. 
2.1 Application of SFTA during software 
development life cycle 
Researchers and practitioners generally agree that 
applying SFTA at the code level is a very 
cumbersome and labor-intensive activity. In addition, 
it is a well known fact that defect detection and 
correction at the implementation phase is much more 
costly than at the earlier stages of the software 
development life cycle. Given this rationale, the 
SATC team recommends applying SFTA to 
requirements and design. The process is to use SFTA 
during the requirements and design phase to identify 
the critical component of the software where safety 
and hazardous states are the major concerns. Then 
SFTA may be applied at the code level only for these 
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critical components. The above approach follows the 
principle of divide and conquer, which is one of the 
fundamental methods of solving problems. By 
partitioning the system (to the safety critical 
component and those that are not safety critical), we 
narrow the scope of the area in which FTA has to be 
applied. Of course it is assumed that special attention 
is given to the flagged components (i.e., safety 
critical partition) during the development and 
verification and validation activities. 
SFTA at requirements phase 
The main objectives of applying SFTA during this 
phase of software development are to: 
• Identify weaknesses that exist in the requirement 
specification. Weak requirements will either be 
modified or additional requirements will be 
added in order to eliminate or mitigate these 
weaknesses. 
• Identify all the requirements that have a direct 
effect on the safety of the system. This can be 
done either through the knowledge collected as 
part of the requirements elicitation, or identifying 
the pattern of use and the surrounding 
environment that could affect the software, by 
forcing it to a hazardous state. Once 
requirements with safety considerations are 
identified, these requirements will be traced 
throughout the development life cycle. It is 
assumed that a requirement traceability matrix is 
included in the software development artifacts to 
help with this task. 
SFTA at design phase 
The main objectives of applying SFTA during this 
phase are to: 
• Identify the weaknesses of the high-level design. 
At this stage, appropriate modifications will be 
implemented in order to strengthen the overall 
design. 
• Identify the components/modules and 
subcomponents that have direct effect on 
software safety. These modules and those 
implementing the requirements with the safety 
consequences are identified. Then, special 
attention may be given to the generation of their 
implementation, by guaranteeing the elimination 
of design factors that could force the system into 
a hazardous state. The details of the application 
of SFTA during the design phase are discussed 
in Section 3 of this paper. 
SFTA at implementation phase 
The main objective of applying FTA to code is to 
identify critical code components that have direct 
bearing on the safety of the software. In this phase, 
fault trees will be generated for all the modules 
previously identified (during the detailed design 
phase) as critical modules affecting software safety. 
The goals here are to: 
• Identifying a set of key instructions that could 
place the system in a hazardous state 
• Add appropriate safeguards that prevent the 
software from reaching such a state. 
As previously mentioned, the majority of the 
previous research in SFTA has been applicable to this 
phase of the software development. One of the major 
advantages of the above approach is to avoid 
generating fault trees unnecessarily for significant 
amounts of code in the system. It limits the 
application of FT to small, but critical portions of the 
code that affect the safety of the software. Applying 
FTA to the entire system requirements specification 
and the detailed design phase will be much more 
efficient than broadly applying it at the code level. 
Another advantage of this approach is that by 
applying SFTA at every stage of development, safety 
issues are identified early in the development life 
cycle and remedies can be implemented as early as 
possible. 
3. Application of SFTA to Unified Modeling 
Language Artifacts 
Applying SFTA during the detailed design phase will 
produce the best return on investment. It is here that a 
software product exists in its most ideal form for 
SFTA to be applied. Software is represented in the 
form of some number of modules where 
functionality, interfaces, inputs, and outputs are well 
defined. This is the closest we get to representing 
software structure in a way that is analogous to 
hardware modeling, a point prior to development 
where the salient system features, i.e., gates, encoder, 
functionality, interfaces, inputs and outputs are well 
defined. The same can be said about a software 
system at the detailed design phase. Here the 
software is represented with an equivalent amount of 
detail that we can achieve the equivalent degree of 
insight. Applying SFTA at this point enables us to 
identify modules (objects, methods, or functions) that 
could directly affect the safety of the system. In both 
the preliminary and detailed design phases, once a 
module or a set of modules is identified as having 
possible impacts on the safety of the system, 
additional safeguards need to be embedded into the 
design in order to guarantee their safe operation. It is 
worth mentioning again that generating fault trees for 
the system at this point will be a much more efficient 
choice than generating them during the 
implementation phase. With the exception of Pai’s 
work [9] on dynamic fault trees for systems, we were 
unable to find any previous dynamic work that 
applied SFTA during the design phase. 
The SATC team chose the Object Oriented Design 
(OOD) methodology as the vehicle for the 
application of SFTA at the design level. There are 
two primary reasons for choosing OOD:  
1) Much recent software design uses OOD and the 
designs are implemented using OO languages, 
and  
2) Recently many OODs use the UMLTM (Unified 
Modeling Language), which is standardized and 
commonly used by the software development 
community. 
UMLTM uses a number of views and diagrams to 
describe software systems. The problem is how to 
relate these to the notation used in FTA. As the first 
step, we looked at all the different UMLTM diagrams 
and identified those we believe best match the SFTA. 
During this process, we identified the activity, 
sequence and state diagrams, as the first candidates 
for the application of SFTA. Communicating and 
validating critical system details becomes 
challenging, to say the least. This is because most end 
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users are not familiar with OO design artifacts such 
as graphs and diagrams; however, the majority of 
customers in the aerospace industry are familiar with 
hardware, they are generally comfortable with logic 
diagrams, which is the fundamental concept behind 
fault trees. Even in those rare instances where 
customers are unfamiliar with the concepts behind 
logic diagrams, it is relatively easy to achieve a 
comfort level with a handful of logic gates in a 
sequence diagram. These findings suggest that SFTA 
should be used not only as a verification technique 
for the software design, but also as a communication 
vehicle with customers.Our work also indicates that 
customers, after reviewing a fault tree, easily detect 
the occurrences of missing design components. By 
pointing out these missing components, they are 
actually completing the fault tree, thereby improving 
quality of the design as well as the ultimate system. 
Initially we applied SFTA to the activity diagram. 
While we learned that it is possible to apply SFTA to 
the activity diagram, we also learned that special care 
is needed in order to handle any loop in an activity 
diagram. There is some ongoing research in this area, 
which appears promising; however, much work is 
still needed in this area. We then attempted to apply 
SFTA to the sequence diagram, at which point we 
came across additional findings. We learned that 
while SFTA may serve as a technique for verification 
of design, it could also serve as a vehicle for 
improved communication with customers and other 
stakeholders. We have developed a partial paradigm 
for transforming sequence diagrams into software 
fault trees. Ultimately, we applied SFTA to the state 
diagram. We arrived at the same set of observations 
as in the case of sequence diagrams. Figure 1 
represents the state diagram for a pay at the pump 
system, with its corresponding fault tree diagram 
represented in Figure 2. As noted for activity and 
sequence diagrams, special care must be given when 
representing timing constraints and occurrences of 
iteration. 
 
4. SFTA FOR USE CASE BASED 
REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS 
There exists very little published work regarding the 
application of SFTA in use case based requirement 
analysis process. In use-case based fault tree analysis 
work, the major functionalities carried by use cases 
are derived first and afterwards fault tree is drawn 
manually for the failure scenarios for such 
functionalities. Douglass’s work reported in has 
stressed upon first drawing the fault tree and then link 
the child nodes of the fault tree with the suitable use 
case functionality. The work regarding the functional 
hazard assessment (FHA) of use cases via integrated 
application of a technique named functional failure 
analysis (FFA) and fault trees.  
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5. PROPOSED SFTA APPROACH FOR UCRT 
The work regarding how to apply SFTA on the 
textual description of use case in the form of UCRT 
is missing from literature and the approach presented 
in this section will try to fill that gap. The proposed 
approach will take UCRT of various use case 
scenarios as input. The major requirement of the 
presented approach is that hazard should be 
expressed in the form of incompatible states of its 
components. For example, consider a software 
system which controls the functioning of two 
components say X (with possible states x1, x2, x3) 
and Y (with possible states y1 & y2). Now hazard 
state can be expressed as X=x1 and Y = y2 if and 
only if this combination of states of X and Y is found 
to be serious and dangerous. The state change matrix 
of UCRT will be used to identify those action steps 
which can contribute in the occurrence of the selected 
root hazard. Each and every event and action step 
mentioned under normal flow of events of every 
UCRT has been assigned a logical time stamp in 
increasing order. This logical time stamp will help in 
identifying the component whose transition occurred 
first than the other. 
Proposed Approach 
Input: UCRT of use cases & hazardList = {list of 
hazard states} 
Assumptions: 
1. Hazards are expressed using states. [For example 
elevator = moving and door=open]. 
2. Hazard can occur only during the 
execution/realization of use case action steps. 
3. The fault tree will be drawn only for those action 
steps from UCRT which can contribute for the 
root hazard. 
4. Timing related hazards have not been considered 
for this approach and that’s why each action step 
has been assigned a logical time stamp rather 
than physical time. 
FOR each hazard state in the hazard List 
DO 
(i) Identify the UCRTs which can contribute in above 
hazard. 
(ii) IF number of UCRTs associated with the selected 
hazard state is more than 1 THEN 
(a) For each UCRT identified in step (i) above draw the 
fault tree after identifying the action steps from that UCRT 
which can contribute in hazard state. 
(b) Combine the fault tree(s) created above steps by an OR 
gate and feed the output to root event 
(c) Add any hardware related erroneous event if it can 
independently cause the hazard 
ELSE 
Draw the fault tree from the steps of single use case using 
state change matrix  
(d) Determine the minimal cut sets for the fault tree created 





Description of the Proposed Approach 
The operational details of the above mentioned 
approach has been descried below by taking a 
hypothetical hazard 
X=’a’ and Y = ‘b’ as an example. (Note that X and Y 
are components where as ‘a’ and ‘b’ are states). 
(a) How to identify UCRTs which can contribute 
in the selected hazard X = ‘a’ and Y = ‘b’. 
Scan the state change matrix of each UCRT for the 
entry X=’a’ and if found then within same UCRT 
search for Y =’b’. If found mark that UCRT 
otherwise ignore that UCRT (Note that X = ‘a’ and Y 
= ‘b’ may appear in different rows). 
(b) How to identify the action steps from the 
selected UCRT which can contribute in the hazard 
X=’a’ and Y=’b’. 
(i) Scan the UCRT to find out the first occurrence for 
the entry X =’a’ and note down the logical time ‘t1’ 
for that action step. Scan the UCRT to find out the 
first occurrence for the entry Y =’b’ and note down 
the logical time ‘t2’ for that action step. 
(ii) If t1 is less than t2 then scan UCRT to note down 
the logical time ‘t3’ of the last action step when 
X=’a’ and note down the events and actions that 
occurred between time t3 and t2. Otherwise (when t2 
< t1) scan UCRT to note down the logical time ‘t3’ of 
the last action step when Y=’b’ and note down the 
events and actions that occurred between time t3 and 
t1. 
(c) How to draw the fault tree for the selected 
action steps of UCRT. 
If transition of the state of component X from state 
‘a’ to any other state occurs earlier in UCRT than 
transition of state of component Y from state ’b’ to 
any other state then it means hazard can occur if state 
transition of X from ’a’ has not occurred and 
Y has successful made transition to state ‘b’. 
Otherwise the other alternative for the occurrence of 
the root hazard may be that the transition of Y from 
state ’b’ has not occurred at all and X has successful 
made transition to state ‘a’. Identify the erroneous 
events which prevent the state transition from 
occurring for that component whose logical time (t1 
& t2 noted above) is less and feed them to an 
appropriate OR gate. Identify the events and actions 
which changes the state of that component which 
makes transition at a later point and feed these events 
to an AND gate. In the end the out put of previous 
OR gate should be feed to the AND gate to complete 
the fault tree. 
5. SFTA APPLICATION FOR ELEVATOR 
CONTROL APPLICATION 
The TABLE II and III indicate the UCRTs for a 
select destination use case when elevator is idle and 
when it is moving. The state change matrix of both 
the tables records the states of three components 
elevator, motor and door. An elevator can be in any 
of the five possible states as {idle _ prepare_to_move 
_ moving _ prepare_to_stop_at_floor _ at_floor}, 
motor can be in any of the two possible states 
{started _ stopped} and door has only two possible 
states {open _ closed}. When the elevator is idle it 
remains on the last visited floor with door open. 
When elevator is in moving state then door should 
not be in open state and similarly elevator = idle and 
door = closed combination state should exists only 
for a specified period of time. The elevator door and 
motor are synchronous devices in the sense that they 
report back their status (open or closed in case of 
door, started or stopped in case of motor) and their 
working is strictly controlled by elevator controller 
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application. The elevator button and floor buttons are 
asynchronous devices and they only notify the system 
when ever user presses either the floor or elevator 
button and system will respond suitably by carrying 
out the desired action. 
SFTA Application for UCRTs of TABLE II and 
III 
Step1. hazardList = {elevator = ‘moving’ and door 
=’open’ 
(elevator is in moving state and door is in open state), 
elevator = ‘at_floor’ & door =’closed’ (door does not 
open on reaching the floor)}. 
Step2. 
(a) Drawing Fault Tree for the hazard elevator = 
moving and door = open. 
(i) Identification of use cases which can contribute 
in the above hazard. 
The careful observation of state change matrix of 
each identifies UCRTs of TABLE II and TABLE III 
as both contains entries for elevator = moving and 
door = open. 
(ii) Drawing of Fault Tree for the selected UCRTs.  
Drawing Fault Tree from TABLE II. 
At the action step 2(iv) with logical time 8 of TABLE 
II, elevator changes its state from idle to moving. 
Similarly at action 2(ii) of TABLE II with logical 
time 6, door changes its state from open to close. It 
clearly indicates that door has changed its state 
earlier than elevator and therefore the possibility is 
that door state has not made the transition from open 
to closed where as elevator state has successfully 
make the transition from idle to moving. The action 
steps that can force the system in to hazard state are 
{2(ii), 2(iii) & 2(iv)}. The errors that can occur at 
step 2(ii) are: system fails to give the door close 
command (Event E1 of Figure 3) or door does not 
close upon system command (Event E2 of Figure 3). 
Similarly error that can occur at step 2(iii) is: system 
wrongly determines the status of door as closed 
where as it is still open (Event E2 of Figure 3). The 
error that can occur at step 2(iv) is that system issues 
motor start command when door is still open (Event 
E2 of Figure 3). The fault tree drawn from TABLE I 
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Drawing Fault Tree from TABLE III 
Similarly the fault tree from TABLE III for hazard 
elevator = moving and door = open can be drawn 
and is shown in Figure 3. It should be noted that in 
TABLE III elevator state is changing first from 
moving to preparing_to_stop_at_floor where as door 
is changing its state from closed to open at a later 
point in time. There is a possibility that elevator state 
may not change whereas door state may change and 
hence can lead to a hazard. 
Combining fault Trees for both use cases 
The fault trees drawn from TABLE II & III are 
combined via top level OR gate as shown in Figure 3. 
Adding any other event if required. 
The error event B3 has been added to complete the 
fault tree. It is basically an independent hardware 
failure and can happen at any point of time and has 
the potential to cause the root hazard alone. The 
complete fault tree the hazard elevator = moving and 
door = open is shown in the Figure 3. 
(b) Drawing Fault Tree for the hazard elevator = 
at_floor and door = closed. 
The fault tree for the hazard elevator = at_floor and 
door = closed is shown in Figure 3. 
(c) Determine the minimal cut sets and derive 
safety requirements 
The minimal cut sets for the fault tree of the Figure 3 
are as follows: 
(E3 * D4 * C4) + (E4 * D4 * C4) + (E1 * D2 * C2) +  
(E2 * D2 * C2) + (B3) 
(Note * means AND whereas + means OR). 
For AND sequence of events the safety requirements 
can be provided for any one of the events whereas for 
OR sequence of events the safeguard will have to be 
provided for every event. The events E1, E3, D2, D4, 
C2 & C4 are erroneous events related to software 
failure where as E2, E4 & B3 are erroneous events 
related with hardware failures where as rest are 
intermediate events. Now it is known that how top 
event can occur and what logical combination of 
events can cause it, so safety requirements can be 
derived for the most important ones. For example 
consider the first sequence of events {E3 * D4 * C4}. 
The event D4 is most important one and if safeguard 
against it is provided in the system, then the risk 
related with the occurrence of root node can be 
minimized. The event D4 is: system check 
determines the motor as stopped where as it is still 
moving. There are two ways to deal this event- either 
allows it to happen and then detect the error and 
provide a additional level safeguard for it or make 
necessary safe guards so that it should not occur. The 
first approach is generally followed i.e. use a 
monitoring object to observe the working of elevator 
controller application which can take necessary 
actions i.e. activation of emergency shutdown 
mechanism in case such event occurs. This way of 
providing a safe guard is an example of Monitor- 
Actuator design pattern. The same safe guard can be 
applied for event D2. The safeguards for D4 & D2 
eliminates the first four sequences {(E3 * D4 * C4) + 
(E4 * D4 * C4) + (E1 * D2 * C2) + (E2 * D2 * C2)} 
from the minimal cut sets. Now only one event B3 
which is an independent hardware failure is left 
which can still cause the root hazard. The safeguard 
against it will be to provide additional safety features 
in the elevator controller application itself at design 
time – which will detect the malfunction of door and 
activates the emergency shout down mechanism or 
stopping the elevator to a nearest floor. 
Similarly minimal cut sets for the tree of Figure 3 are 
X + Y. Since X is software control error event – the 
use of controller object via an actuator-monitor 
design pattern will be suitable and Y is an 
independent hardware failure – so this 
malfunctioning should be detected by the controller 
application and suitable response action should be 
activated. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The effective strengths of SFTA in indentifying 
missing and additional safety requirements from use 
case textual description expressed in natural language 
has been demonstrated in this paper. The main 
weakness of SFTA which has been observed in the 
past by various researchers also is its tedious and 
time consuming nature. SFTA being a backward 
safety analysis technique can not sometimes identify 
all erroneous events and that’s why to achieve better 
results SFTA application should be integrated with 
forward safety analysis technique such as SFMEA as 
has been explored by Lutz 
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